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Abstract
In this study we investigate the effects of Price Matching Guarantees (PMGs)
commercial policies on U.S. online consumer electronics daily prices. By applying
a Diff-in-Diff identification strategy we find evidence in favor of price reductions
occurring after the PMG policy is repealed.
We further investigate if such effect is heterogeneous according to products char-
acteristics, by exploiting User Generated Contents (UGCs, as products popularity
and quality) and online search visibility measures (Google Search Rank). Esti-
mates suggest that for high quality (visibility) products PMGs policies harms
competition by keeping prices high, while for low quality (visibility) products,
prices decrease during the policy validity period.
1 Introduction
Online sales platforms have recently gained increasing importance in both retail and
wholesale markets.1 Such markets are characterized by the supply of personalized
services, more convenient delivery schedules and the ability to reach a very high
number of consumers. In addition, platforms claim to warrant lower prices with
respect to traditional stores through the provision of offers, promotions, down prices
and other price discounting policies. Among these options, online sales platforms
*A previous version of this paper was included in the Ph.D. dissertation of Simone Robbiano and
Paolo Marocco. The authors thank seminar participants at the 61st Conference of the Italian Economic
Association. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Corresponding author. e-mail address: simone.robbiano@economia.unige.it
1The term “online platform” identifies a range of digital services that facilitates interactions between
two or more distinct but interdependent sets of users (whether firms or individuals) who interact
through the service via the Internet (OECD, 2019). Online sales platforms can operate as online
retailers, as a marketplace for third-party sellers or they can offer both services.
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often implement Price Matching Guarantees (PMGs) policies, that is the promise to
reimburse price differences when competitors offer a lower prices.2
PMGs policies are surely appealing for customers and can increase consumer
confidence and brand fidelity. However, the announcement to tie prices to those of
competitors can have anti-competitive effects and sustain high prices, thus harming
consumers’ welfare.
Most of theoretical literature agrees on the fact that PMGs reduce firms’ incentive
to compete on prices and lower the motivation for consumers to search better sale
conditions (Hay, 1981; Salop, 1986). However, in some models, PMGs are considered
as tools for price discriminating or as real discounting policies (Png and Hirshleifer,
1987; Belton, 1987). Therefore, empirical analyses become particularly relevant in
order to understand under what conditions such pricing policies reduce consumers’
welfare. Indeed, the applied literature analyzing this issue is scant and does not
provide conclusive results (Mago and Pate, 2009; Zhuo, 2017).
Our work adds to this literature by providing empirical evidence on the effect of
platforms’ PMGs policies on daily consumer electronics prices observed on US online
market. We have focused on the NewEgg platform that exclusively sells consumer
electronics products and implements PMGs policies that turn on and off over time
(blinking PMGs). Given that our identification strategy is based on a comparison of
price levels before and after the policy shutdown, we excluded platforms that never
stop offering PMGs (like Target).
In particular, we apply a Diff-in-Diff (DiD) approach where we consider as the treated
sample the pool of NewEgg products interested by PMGs policies. Differently from
standard practices in studies adopting a DiD approach, we build the control sample
with price data for the same products observed on a different platform, namely
Amazon, that never offers PMGs to customers. Furthermore, in order to ensure that
our counterfactual sample is less likely to be influenced by the PMG policy adopted by
NewEgg, we have considered data from the Amazon UK platform, instead of Amazon
US. Indeed, price observed on Amazon US might not be completely independent from
the policy under scrutiny, because of price tracking practices frequently adopted by
platforms.
Estimates provide evidence in favor of an average price reduction of about 3.9%
after the interruption of the PMG policy. However, in order to have a more detailed
picture of the issue, we investigate if such effect is heterogeneous, depending on
products characteristics. In particular, we focus on products features that might affect
the outcome of PMGs policies and that can be recovered exclusively on online markets.
2For example, NewEgg’s PMG policy states that "if you purchase an item from Newegg.com which
is carrying the Price Match Guarantee badge at the time of purchase, then find the exact same item
at a lower price by Newegg or a major retailer, just let us know, and we’ll send you a Newegg
Customer Care Card to cover the difference". See https://kb.newegg.com/knowledge-base/
price-match-guarantee/.
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Platform data allow us to obtain information from User Generated Contents (UGCs),
like products’ popularity and quality, as well as online search visibility (Google Search
Rank); indeed, we believe that these product characteristics might provide indirect
information on consumers heterogeneity. Estimates conducted on specific sub-samples
show that when the PMG is interrupted, low quality (and low search rank) products
experience a price increase of about 3.4%, while for high quality (and high visibility)
products a price reduction of about 3.7% is observed. These findings are in line with
the lack of unambiguous predictions of the theoretical literature.
The anti-competitive effects of PMGs observed for high quality (visibility) products
has been predicted by theoretical models where such polices make collusion more
likely (Hay, 1981; Salop, 1986; Cabral et al., 2018). These findings can be also
explained by the theoretical predictions of a class of models, like Corts (1997) and
Nalca et al. (2010), where PMGs are tools for discriminating customers according
to their sensitiveness to price and products quality. These models also explain our
results obtained for products characterized by low visibility (quality). Indeed, the
willingness to engage in search activity could indirectly identify those customers
whose demand is more rigid, as argued by the search literature (Ellison and Ellison,
2009).
The analysis conducted in this study enriches the literature on price effects of
PMGs by using very detailed platform daily price data for a specific market (consumer
electronics) where such policies are very common. First, our work overcomes previous
research (see Zhuo, 2017) by using real-time data instead of historical information.
This makes the use of price tracking websites and algorithms that extract data from
price charts outdated. Second, the DiD identification strategy adopted is based on the
construction of a control group with a novel approach; finally, products characteristics
based on Users Generated Contents (UGCs) are employed for the first time in order
to study possible heterogeneous effects of such policies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss
related literature and in Section 3 we accurately describe the data extraction process
and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains our identification
strategy and in Section 5 we discuss estimates results and robustness analysis. Section
6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature has analysed possible impacts of PMGs on different market
outcomes, since such commercial policies might affect the behaviour of firms and
consumers in different ways.
The most common prediction of the theoretical models is that PMGs hamper competi-
tion by keeping prices high and sustaining collusive practices; moreover, some authors
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suggest that they might be tools for realising price discrimination or signalling cheap
prices.
Hay (1981), Salop (1986) and Belton (1987) have first suggested that PMGs can
sustain collusion in oligopoly models; they highlight that such clauses might be
considered as threats to punishment for firms that lower cartel prices, thus reducing
firms’ incentive to deviate from the agreement. They argue that, if all competitors in
the market adopt a PMG policy, none of them has the incentive to lower its price and
the latter tends to the monopolistic level. Moreover, they agree on the fact that the
adoption of such policies increase the stability of the cartel, as any price cut must be
refunded to the consumers, so that the policy generates a credible penalty system.
Several other papers support the pro-collusive argument by extending the basic
oligopolistic setting (see, among others, Doyle, 1988; Logan and Lutter, 1989; Baye
and Kovenock, 1994), while other authors explore the impact of PMGs extending the
analysis in dynamic, multi-stage and Hotelling frameworks (see, among others, Chen,
1995; Lu and Wright, 2010; Hviid and Shaffer, 2010; Pollak et al., 2017; Constantinou
and Bernhardt, 2018). Cabral et al. (2018) suggest that a PMG can be a collusion
enacting practice. In the model two firms alternate over time in setting prices; given
that starting a collusion process implies several risks, like for example antitrust
penalties, firms include collusion costs in their decisions. The main prediction of the
model is that the probability of tacit collusion rises when the policy is in place.
In studies reviewed so far, it is implicitly assumed that customers automatically
claim the price guarantee whenever they find a price differential: indeed, this is not
always the case, because of lack of information or because there are small costs for
the customer to activate a guarantee, the so called “hassle costs”. Hviid and Shaffer
(1999) highlight that the presence of hassle costs undermines possible anti-competitive
effects of PMGs, but do not completely cancel them. Precisely, with symmetric firms
PMGs are unable to support any price increase in presence of hassle costs. Indeed,
each firm will be interested in lowering price levels by an amount that is marginally
smaller than these costs, so that buyers are attracted from cheaper firms and do not
activate the guarantee. Otherwise, with asymmetric firms, a rise in prices might be
supported, but not at the monopolistic level. Moreover, their model can explain why
universal adoption is not a realistic assumption of previous studies.
Some other models explore the possibility that sellers use PMGs policies as a price
discrimination tool. If customers are different in terms of some subjective character-
istic, like information on prices and guarantee terms, degree of loyalty to a specific
retailer or level of hassle costs in requesting the refund, firms could use the price
guarantee to discriminate between different groups of consumers.
Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Belton (1987) and Corts (1997) first suggested duopoly
models where firms discriminate between different consumers groups, namely “unso-
phisticated” customers and “sophisticated” ones. Consumer segmentation and PMGs
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allow firms to set higher prices for unsophisticated consumers, while sophisticated
ones benefit from the lowest price guaranteed by the policy. The main intuition from
this strand of literature is that price discrimination might at least benefit some cus-
tomers with actually lower prices.3
Finally, Moorthy and Winter (2006) suggest that PMGs might be a credible signal
of low prices, if low cost firms adopt the policy and (high cost) competitors can not
match the policy. Similarly, Jain and Srivastava (2000) develop a theoretical model
that identifies the conditions under which PMGs might lead to lower market prices.4
In the presence of informed and uninformed consumers (about prices and store char-
acteristics) and of different kind of stores (in terms of size, service quality and so on),
only stores with low prices offer PMGs policies.5
Despite the theoretical literature is rich and analyses several aspects of PMGs
policies, the empirical evidence is scant and does not provide conclusive results. Some
studies focus on specific markets, like tyre or gasoline, while others analyze retailing
prices from supermarkets, grocery stores or online platform markets.
Analysing daily price quotes from the tyre industry advertisements, on 61 US Sunday
newspapers observed for three months in 1996, Arbatskaya et al. (2000), through a
Feasible Generalised Least Square approach, find weak evidence of anti-competitive
effects of PMGs and show that an increase in the number of firms implementing the
policy leads to a 10% increase in prices.6 Cabral et al. (2018), focus instead on daily
pricing policies adopted by the Shell network of gas stations in Germany in 2015.7
Leveraging on gas stations localization and consumers demographics as sources of
identification, they suggest that PMGs can be a collusion enacting policy. Gas station
prices have been analyzed also by Byrne and De Roos (2019) for Australia by means of
a detailed 15 years time series dataset. Authors argue that the majority of gas stations
prices follow a weekly cycle and that dominant firms can use PMGs to coordinate
market prices and reduce price competition. Similar results can be found in Chilet
(2018), who analyses pricing policies of three big retail pharmacy chains in Chile,
observed over the period 2006-2008. The author follows an identification strategy
based on the estimation of a demand model, in which quantity sold is a function of
the differences between own prices with the competitors ones, around the time period
where collusive price increases occurred.
Hess and Gerstner (1991) analyse the effect of PMGs on prices by collecting weekly
data of 114 goods sold in several US supermarkets and grocery stores, from 1984 to
1986. Authors, by means of a time series analysis, provide evidence in favor of higher
3Similar results can be found also in Edlin (1997) and Nalca et al. (2010).
4Authors have realized two experiments to analyze the effects of PMGs policies on prices’ consumer
perceptions and have shown that consumers expect lower prices from PMGs.
5Similar results can be found also in Moorthy and Zhang (2006).
6The same authors in Arbatskaya et al. (2006) confirm their results by analysing the same data
with a different approach.
7See also Wilhelm (2016).
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prices of about 1-2% when the guarantee is introduced. Moorthy and Winter (2006)
argue instead that the adoption or non-adoption of the PMG might be interpreted
as a way to signal the seller service–price profile.8 Authors analyse data for several
product categories from 46 Canadian retailers observed in 2002. They assume the
existence of informed and uninformed consumers and show that PMGs might be a
tool to signal low prices to uninformed consumers. In particular, they find that PMGs
are mainly adopted by low cost/low service chain stores. Similar results can be found
in Chung et al. (2016) for three leading hypermarkets in Korea. Finally, Zhuo (2017)
focuses on online platforms and collect US price data from online price trackers for
150 products offered on Amazon in 2012. The author observes prices during and
after the implementation of PMGs policies by two big-box stores (Target and Best
Buy) targeted specifically on Amazon prices; by applying DiD and RDD methods, the
author suggests that prices increase by about six percentage points during the period
of validity of the policy.9 Moreover, the analysis highlights an heterogeneous impact
of PMGs, with larger price increases for initially lower-priced goods.10
3 Data
3.1 Data Extraction
In order to study the impact of PMGs on prices, we focus on the online consumer
electronics market, since it is one of the most widespread sector on online retailing
and is often interested by such pricing policies. In particular, electronic products
are search goods, whose quality can be evaluated before the purchase: the advent of
online markets has made this process much cheaper and faster and is most likely to
affect the impact of such policies, whose outcome depends, among other factors, by
the level of search and hassle costs. Moreover, electronic goods are barely affected by
seasonal effects, so that prices signals are more stable over time and show low price
differentials across countries (Gorodnichenko and Talavera, 2017; Stallkamp and
Schotter, 2019). These characteristics allow us to improve the identification strategy
through the construction of a more refined control group (see the next section).
Among different online retailing platforms, we choose to focus on NewEgg, a
leading online US retailer of consumer electronics products, that implements a so-
8The authors refer to the retailer service-price profile as to any sellers characteristic that might
induce customers to choose one seller over another one, like better sales assistance and customer care,
a clear Web site, personalised delivery and selling services.
9Similar results can be found also in Wu et al. (2015), Haruvy and Leszczyc (2016).
10Some other authors analyse the impact of price-beating guarantees, that are less widespread
policies with similar terms as price matching ones (in price beating guarantees refund exceeds the price
difference). Studies that refer to these policies argue that, with respect to price matching guarantees,
they might be serving different purposes in practice and likely be effective in enhancing competition.
Experimental literature also focuses on the effect of price matching and price-beating guarantees:
however, experimental results lack the complexity of real interactions between sellers and consumers.
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called "blinking" PMG, i.e. a price guarantee that turns on and off over time on
selected items. Given that our identification strategy is based on the comparison of
prices before and after a policy shutdown, we do not consider platforms that apply
PMGs to wide groups of products continuously over time (i.e. Target, among others).
In particular, NewEgg communicates the period of validity of the price guarantee
by means of a label that appears on the specific product online page; the customer
who discovers the PMG badge has 14 calendar days of time to find the same title at
a lower price from US competitors belonging to a declared list.11 PMGs policies are
often repeated over time on the same products without any notice, so that consumers
looking for deals have to exert an higher effort in the search process.
In order to build the sample we have identified 100 NewEgg products interested
by PMGs on May 10th 2018. For such products we have collected price data and the
presence of the NewEgg’s PMG badge until 31st October 2018. We identify as the
treatment of interest the interruption of the PMG policy, so that prices observed on
the NewEgg platform represent the treated sample. The control sample has been
built by recovering price data for the same products observed on NewEgg but sold on
the Amazon UK platform, that never offers PMGs policies.12 This reduces the number
of observed products, so that the final sample includes 29 products belonging to 19
sub-categories (computer hardware, tablet and computers, mobile phones, printers
and scanners, PC accessories, speakers for domotics, screens and audio devices). In
the Appendix we provide a detailed list of selected products (Tables A1 and A2).
It is worth noting that both Amazon and NewEgg operate either as online retailers
or markeplaces for third-party sellers who pay fees and royalties to access to the
customer base. In such marketplace, online platforms often act only as a payment
intermediary and goods are kept in the third-party sellers inventory. Thus, in order
to build a valid control group, we have excluded data on products sold by third-party
sellers on both Amazon and NewEgg platforms.
The retrieving of sample data has been a challenging task. Given the absence of
ready-made and easy-to-use repositories on price data, we have developed an ad-hoc
scraping program (in Python language) able to protect the scraping process from
unpredictable changes of the page and capable to recover the data without stressing
the site, thus limiting the risk of interruptions due to firewalls.13 In particular,
the scraping process has been supported by several alert tools signalling periodical
changes of the internal page structure.14
11With title we refer to a product with the same brand and model number. NewEgg, after check-
ing the validity of the claim, sends a Customer Care Card to refund the price difference (Source:
https://kb.newegg.com/knowledge-base/price-match-guarantee/).
12See the next section for a rationale on this choice.
13A typical problem is to intercept daily changes of web pages not only about prices, but also
concerning other dynamic contents, such as the number of customer reviews, the average rating and so
forth. Code available from authors upon request.
14Indeed, platforms frequently change the deep structure of the page, in a not visible way by the
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The process of data collection has required the daily implementation of these main
steps:
i Sign up for subscription to Amazon Web Service (AWS) cloud, in order to use
virtual servers in which to install and launch the program;15
ii Accept the norms and terms of use of the platform site, in order to be compliant to
the server navigation policies;
iii Launch the daily loop process, in order to navigate among product pages, select
the field tags, get the data and save on a server disk. Each scraping session runs
about 20 minutes every day.
In addition to products daily prices retrieved on both platforms, we also collect
several product characteristics available exclusively on online sales platforms. In
particular, we recover some User Generated Contents (UGCs), like the absolute
number of reviews received by the specific product under consideration and the most
popular one in the same subcategory, as the product rating; moreover, from Google we
perform and collect a product’s search rank.
The absolute number of reviews is a dynamic information which represents a sort
of popularity index, since it is proportional to the product market diffusion.16 We
also calculate the relative number of reviews as the ratio between the number of
reviews of each product and the amount of reviews received from the most popular
product in the same subcategory.17 This normalized index, that ranges from zero to
one, shows the relative popularity of the product with respect to the other items of
the same sub-category. We also collect data on product ratings (stars) provided by
consumers. We consider the number of stars gained by each product, ranging from
zero (low quality) to five (high quality), as a proxy of product quality. Finally, we
develop a search index as a proxy of the time spent on search engines to discover the
page of a certain product. More precisely, the search index represents the probability
to find the product in first ranked positions of Google results.18
It is worth noting that, although the products analysed are sold by Amazon and
NewEgg in different countries, information on some of the considered UGCs (e.g.
rating) maintain their consistency. This property is typical of consumer electronics
goods that have a standardized nature. Concerning the search index, we adopt a
country specific value by launching the Google search engine with specific country
settings (UK and US).
human reader but in a way that affects the program code and the scraping process.
15AWS is a comprehensive, evolving cloud computing platform provided by Amazon.
16In online commerce, product reviews are used by retailing platforms to give consumers an opportu-
nity to comment on products they have purchased, right on the product page.
17See Table A1 in Appendix for details.
18The ranking position of an item is retrieved launching the Google query composed by the sentence:
“the name of product” AND “the name of platform”. The resulting position is then normalized, mapping
in the probability range [0,1].
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3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of 9028 daily price observations (174 days) for 29 products
observed on NewEgg and Amazon UK platforms, from 10 May 2018 until 31 October
2018. Table 1 shows the mean and the standard deviations of prices and selected
product characteristics for the overall sample and for the treated and control group
ones. Prices show a large variability, being the average for the overall sample $240.43
and the standard deviation $283.53. By comparing average values observed over the
two platforms, it emerges that both prices and UGCs display similar values, thus
confirming what has been observed by the previous literature on the low dispersion of
consumer electronics prices across countries (Stallkamp and Schotter, 2019); moreover,
such similarities support our approach for the choice of the control sample. As Table
2 shows, in the case of the treated sample (NewEgg) the average price during the
policy validity period (before treatment) is about $18 higher with respect to the post
implementation period.19
Table 1: Summary Statistics. Treated and Control Samples.
Variables Full Sample Amazon UK NewEgg
Provider Price ($) 240.43 227.72 253.15
(283.53) (262.74) (302.39)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.23 0.26 0.20
(0.27) (0.30) (0.23)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.75 0.85 0.64
(0.30) (0.17) (0.36)
Rating (0-5 stars) 4.14 4.14 4.15
(0.68) (0.48) (0.83)
Table 2: Summary Statistics. NewEgg. Pre and Post Treatment.
Variables Pre Treatment Post Treatment
Provider Price ($) 231.22 209.63
(329.01) (235.21)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.22 0.19
(0.25) (0.23)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.77 0.71
(0.26) (0.31)
Rating (0-5 stars) 4.16 4.06
(0.98) (1.05)
Notes: The pre-treatment period is the policy implementation period.
In order to investigate the issue of heterogeneity in the effect of PMGs policies on
prices, we distinguish products according to products characteristics recovered from
UGCs. In particular we classify products depending on their quality and visibility,
measured trough UGCs as explained in the previous section. Given that quality
19We remember that our treatment is the policy shutdown.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics. Sub-Samples.
Variables
Low Quality High Quality
Low Search Rank High Search Rank
NewEgg Amazon.uk NewEgg Amazon.uk
Provider Price ($) 206.02 95.81 221.06 161.10
(143.92) (35.11) (354.69) (163.90)
Product Popularity (0-1) 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.29
(0.01) (0.01) (0.25) (0.33)
Search Rank (0-1) 0.19 0.38 0.90 0.91
(0.27) (0.38) (0.04) (0.05)
Rating (0-5 stars) 2.93 3.19 4.40 4.45
(0.71) (0.32) (0.49) (0.20)
Notes: For high quality products we mean those with ratings higher than 4. For high
visibility products we mean those with a normalized search index higher than 0,8.
assessment by consumers is highly correlated to products visibility, in Table 3 we show
some descriptive statistics for products classified according to such characteristics.20
Again, data show that products characteristics stemming from UGCs are quite similar
across countries/platforms.
As far as the PMG policy is concerned, NewEgg adopts a blinking strategy, so
that the policy is applied in a non continuous way, often to the same products. Table
4 shows the total number of days of treatment (absence of PMGs) and the average
number of treatments occurred in each sample. This latter information suggests
that, on average, the policy is applied to each product twice during the sample period
(174 days) and such frequency does not seem to be correlated to products quality and
visibility. Indeed, since prices are highly correlated to quality, we can reasonably
assume that there is not selection into treatment associated to products price or
quality (visibility), so that the assumption of random assignment required by the
identification strategy seems reasonably fulfilled. On the other side, it seems that, for
low quality (and visibility) products, the policy implementation period is longer.
Table 4: Summary Statistics. PMGs.
Variables Full Sample
Low Quality High Quality
Low Search Rank High Search Rank
Treatment Duration (# days) 38.25 58.13 29.30
(39.94) (43.37) (33.54)
Number of Treatments 2.38 1.81 2.78
(1.75) (0.82) (2.06)
Notes: Treatment duration is the average number of days without PMGs. The sample
period includes 174 days.
Another important issue is related to the representativeness of our sample. Figure
1 represents the distribution of products by price classes (10). The graph shows that
20High quality products are those characterized by a rating higher than 4/5, while high visibility
ones are those endowed of a search rank index greater than 0.8.
10
22 products out of 29 belong to the first two price deciles, with price ranging between
0$ and 240$. This picture closely matches a typical distribution observed in consumer
electronics (Coad, 2009), often characterized by a large amount of low cost accessories
and few luxury goods. Furthermore, calculating the log-price distribution (Figure 2)
and mapping the integer part of this value on the x-axis, we obtain a septile-partition.
By plotting the distribution of products by log-price classes we obtain a distribution
that resembles the Normal one. Such result is in line with those obtained by Coad
(2009).
Figure 1: Products Distribution by Price Classes.
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Figure 2: Products Distribution by Log-Price Classes.
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4 Identification Strategy
We identify the causal effect of PMGs on price levels, by comparing prices before
and after the policy shutdown for a sample of products sold by NewEgg (the treat-
ment group), to the prices average change for the same products sold by Amazon
UK (the control group). Indeed, and crucially for our identification strategy, PMGs
implemented by NewEgg only affects products that are sold in US, thereby naturally
creating a treatment and a control group; the same products sold by Amazon UK
(that never offers price warranties) are less likely to be affected by the policy and well
represents a counterfactual sample mimicking what would have happened to prices of
treated products in the absence of PMGs. This framework provides a quasi-natural
experiment that allows us to study the causal impact of PMGs on prices through a
Diff-in-Diff research design.
This identification approach requires the estimation of the following panel FE
model:21
logPrice i,l,t =αi,l +γ
(
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t
)
+ X Ti,l,tβ+µi,l +τt +ǫi,l,t (1)
The dependent variable, Price i,l,t represents the price (natural logarithm) of good
i, on platform l, at time t; Ti,l,t denotes a binary variable equal to 1 for treated goods;
Pi,t is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for any day since the policy shutdown and
zero otherwise and ǫi,l,t is an error term. The model includes a full set of daily time
dummies, τt, accounting for unobserved time-varying determinants of prices that
are common to all goods. Product fixed effects, µi,l , control for any time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity at the product and platform level, that could be correlated
with the included regressors and that could also drive prices. Moreover, the presence
of individual (product) fixed effects in the Diff-in-Diff research design rises the degree
of comparability of treatment and control groups.
We include a set of covariates, X i,l,t in Equation (1), in order to control for products
characteristics derived by UGCs that might affect the outcome of the PMGs policies.
The γ coefficient associated to the interaction term (Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t) represents the DiD
estimate of the effect of PMGs shutdown on treated products prices and it measures
the average price differential between the treated and the control group.
We also explore the issue of heterogeneity in the effect of PMGs policies on prices.
Indeed, as discussed in the literature review section, most of the predictions of the-
oretical models on the price effects of PMGs policies rely on assumptions related to
the presence of heterogeneous consumers. By distinguishing products according to
consumers’ quality assessment, we indirectly assume that consumers are heteroge-
neous in terms of their preferences towards quality and their availability to pay a
21In a Diff-in-Diff context, a classic model would be built like Y = α+β1(Treated)+β2(Post)+
β3(Treated∗Post)+ε. In all models we exclude Treated and Post terms, since they are multicollinear
with time and product fixed effects.
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price premium for that. Indeed, for high quality goods the price elasticity of demand
is usually assumed to be lower than the price elasticity for low profile goods. We
further classify products according to their visibility, as measured by the search index
described above. We believe that the time spent for finding a product indirectly selects
consumers according to their willingness to engage in search activity and that such
availability is directly correlated to their price sensitiveness.
Based on the above reasoning, we estimate Equation (1) on different sub-samples
built according to product quality and visibility indices. In particular, we analyse
separately high (low) quality products, namely products characterized by rating
greater (lower) than 4/5, and products characterised by high (low) visibility in terms
of Google search rank, namely products whose search index is greater (lower) than 0,8.
Moreover, given that products quality and visibility resulted to be highly correlated,
we split the sample according to both characteristics. As discussed in the Data Section,
such products characteristics do not affect the probability of being treated.
The heterogeneity issue is also investigated with a different approach by estimat-
ing a Triple Difference regression (DDD) on the full sample. In particular, we estimate
the following model:
logPrice i,l,t =αi,l +ϕ
(
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t
)
+ X Ti,l,tβ+µi,l +τt +ωi,l,t (2)
Equation (2) includes an additional component in the interaction term, HRHVi,l,t,
i.e. a dummy variable assuming value 1 for high quality and high visibility products.
The coefficient ϕ of the triple interaction measures the average treatment effect of
PMGs on prices for high quality (visibility) products.
All specifications are estimated by OLS and Standard Errors are robustly esti-
mated. Moreover, following Cameron and Miller (2015), we compute bootstrapped
standard errors with a cluster structure (at product level) and all results are confirmed.
Finally, we conduct an extensive robustness analysis through different falsification
and placebo tests (see the Robustness Analysis Section).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Main Results
In Table 5 and 6 we show DiD estimates; in particular, we first report results obtained
by estimating Equation (1) without including control variables (Table 5, column (1)),
while Table 6 (column (1)) provides estimates obtained after including all control
variables. DiD estimates suggest that the PMG shutdown triggers a significant
reduction of price levels of about 3.9%. Rather comfortingly, the inclusion of control
variables into model (1) does not significantly affect the result. These findings suggest
that, on average, the adoption of PMGs has an anti-competitive effect on prices since,
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after the policy validity period, they show a substantial reduction. These results are
consistent with those obtained by Zhuo (2017) on a large sample of products observed
on the Amazon platform in 2012. However, we follow a rather different identification
strategy. While Zhuo (2017) focuses on price changes observed on the non-adopting
platform, before and after the implementation of PMGs by competitors, we focus on
price changes observed on the adopting platform. Moreover, we innovatively build the
control sample with platform price data for the same treated products but observed in
another country (UK).
To explore whether product properties affect the impact of PMGs on prices, we
split the sample according to different classes of product quality and visibility and
we re-estimate Equation (1). Columns from (2) to (5) in Tables 5 and 6 show results
of this disaggregated analysis. Estimates indicate that a policy repeal produces
a price reduction for both low and high quality products; however, the estimated
coefficients for the low quality sample are not statistically different from zero, while
those for high quality products indicate a statistically significant price reduction of
about 2.5%. When we split the sample according to values assumed by the search
index, results suggest that, when the PMG is interrupted, products characterised by
a low search rank experience a price increase of roughly 2,4%, while for high visibility
products prices decreases of about 5,3%. These findings support the hypothesis that,
in online consumer electronics market, PMGs policies harm competition for high
visible products by keeping prices high, while for low visible products, such policies
have a pro competitive effect on prices.
Indeed, as highlighted in the data section, quality and visibility are highly cor-
related in our sample. Hence, we estimate Equation (1) after splitting the sample
according to both product properties.
Results shown in column (6) and (7) of Table 5 suggest that the PMG shutdown
triggers a reduction of prices for high quality and high visibility products (3,7%), while
prices of low quality and low visibility ones raise of about 3,4%. These findings are
confirmed when we include control variables into the model (Table 6, columns (6)
and (7)) and when we analyse heterogeneous effects of PMGs by means of a Triple
Difference regression approach, as shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7.
Our empirical findings can be explained by the main predictions of theoretical
models analysing the impact of PMGs on prices and competition.
The anti-competitive effect of PMGs observed for high quality (visibility) products has
been predicted by theoretical models where such polices make collusion more likely
(Hay, 1981; Salop, 1986; Cabral et al., 2018). These findings can be also explained by
the theoretical predictions of a class of models, like Corts (1997) and Nalca et al. (2010),
where a PMG is a tool for discriminating customers according to their sensitiveness
to price and products quality. These models also explain our results obtained for
products characterized by low visibility (quality).
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Table 5: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Products Prices (log) FULL SAMPLE L. RATING H. RATING L. VISIBILITY H. VISIBILITY LR-LV HR-HV
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t -0.0401*** -0.0064 -0.0250*** 0.0242*** -0.0543*** 0.0331** -0.0381***
(0.00628) (0.01300) (0.00688) (0.00769) (0.00795) (0.01370) (0.00864)
Observations 9,028 2,896 6,132 2,295 6,733 994 4,864
R-squared 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.990 0.984 0.983 0.983
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.623 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include product popularity, number of reviews and rating.
High quality products have ratings higher than 4. High visibility products have a normalized search index higher than 0,8. LR-LV
are low rating and low search index products, HR-HV are high rating and high search rank products. Robust Standard Errors in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Products Prices (log) FULL SAMPLE L. RATING H. RATING L. VISIBILITY H. VISIBILITY LR-LV HR-HV
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t -0.0424*** -0.0108 -0.0270*** 0.0322*** -0.0577*** 0.0532*** -0.0398***
(0.00629) (0.01510) (0.00693) (0.00786) (0.00799) (0.01310) (0.00879)
Observations 9,028 2,896 6,132 2,295 6,733 994 4,864
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.992 0.985 0.989 0.983
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include product popularity, number of reviews and rating. High
quality products have ratings higher than 4. High visibility products have a normalized search index higher than 0,8. LR-LV are low
rating and low search index products, HR-HV are high rating and high search rank products. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: DDD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices.
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DDD DDD
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t -0.0537*** -0.0556***
(0.00808) (0.00810)
Observations 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.986 0.986
Controls NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product
fixed effects. Controls include product popularity,
number of reviews and rating. HRHVi,l,t is a dummy
equal to 1 for high quality and high visibility prod-
ucts. Robust Standard Errors in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Indeed, most of the predictions of theoretical models on the price effects of PMGs
policies rely on assumptions related to the presence of heterogeneous consumers.
By classifying products on the base of consumers’ quality assessment, we indirectly
assume that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their preferences towards
quality and their availability to pay a price premium for that. Similarly, the time spent
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for finding a product can indirectly select consumers according to their willingness to
engage in search activity and it is reasonable to argue that such availability is directly
correlated to price sensitiveness.
5.2 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we discuss empirical results obtained by conducting an in-depth
robustness analysis of our results.
The first issue that we tackle is the possibility that the effects of the treatment
speed up, stabilize, or mean revert over time. In order to explore this issue, we
estimate a specification of Eq. (1) that includes lags à la Autor (2003) and takes on
the following form:
logPrice i,l,t =αi,l +
5+
∑
j=0
γ j
(
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+ j
)
+ X Ti,l,tβ+µi,l +τt +ǫi,l,t (3)
where Pi,t+ j assumes the value of 1 in day t+ j , and 0 otherwise.
Specification (3) allows the PMGs repeals to generate different effects over time. In
order to lower the number of parameters of the model, we estimate the effect of a
PMG shutdown from the implementation day ( j = 0) until five days later and onward.
Table 8: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices with lags à la Autor (2003).
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+0 -0.0500*** -0.0508**
(0.01610) (0.01610)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+1 -0.0566*** -0.0577**
(0.01580) (0.01570)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+2 -0.0558*** -0.0566**
(0.01960) (0.01960)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+3 -0.0530*** -0.0539**
(0.01990) (0.01990)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+4 -0.0529*** -0.0531**
(0.02030) (0.02030)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+5+ -0.0368*** -0.0395**
(0.00646) (0.00648)
Observations 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.986 0.986
Controls NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.000 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product
fixed effects. Controls include product popularity,
number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard
Errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
According to results shown in Table 8, coefficients related to lagged variables
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are always negative and statistically significant for the full sample. However, point
estimates suggest that the impact of the treatment reaches its maximum after one day
and starts decreasing afterwards. Figure 3 graphically shows parameter estimates
patterns.
Figure 3: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices (Full Sample, with Controls)
with lags à la Autor (2003).
Another important issue in a DiD research design is the presence of pre-treatment
common trends for treated and control samples. This assumption is indeed fundamen-
tal for the validity of the counterfactual policy evaluation analysis.
In order to explore this issue, we show in Figure 4 point estimates values and relative
confidence intervals of the difference in the level of prices between treated and control
products from five days before the treatment to the day of the policy shutdown.22
Plotted point estimates suggest that price levels for the treated platform do not seem
to be significantly different from prices of the control platform before the treatment.
This result provides evidence in favor of the validity of parallel trends assumption for
our samples.
In order to further analyse this issue, we follow Autor (2003) and we estimate Eq.
(3) after including some leads of the treatment interaction variable:
logPrice i,l,t =αi,l +
−5
∑
j=−1
γ j
(
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t+ j
)
+ X Ti,l,tβ+µi,l +τt +ǫi,l,t (4)
22In order to obtain these values, we estimate a panel model where we regress average daily price
differences between the two samples on lead terms for five days before the treatment. We control for
product fixed effects and daily fixed effects.
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Figure 4: Price Differentials Between Treated and Control Groups Before PMGs
Shutdown.
Table 9: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices with Leads à la Autor (2003).
(1) (2)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t−1 -0.0121 -0.0117
(0.0187) (0.0187)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t−2 0.0030 0.0040
(0.0181) (0.0181)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t−3 0.0067 0.0076
(0.0191) (0.0191)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t−4 0.0155 0.0162
(0.0199) (0.0198)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t−5 0.0205 0.0211
(0.0219) (0.0218)
Observations 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.986 0.986
Controls NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES
F Test 0.842 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and
product fixed effects. Controls include prod-
uct popularity, number of reviews and rating.
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
If leads coefficients turn out to be statistically significant, there may be anticipatory
effects and a failure in the parallel trend assumption. According to Table 9 and Figure
5, estimated coefficients of the anticipatory effects are not statistically significant,
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Figure 5: DiD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Prices (Full sample, with Controls)
with Leads à la Autor (2003).
thus providing further evidence in favor of the existence of a parallel trend between
treatment and control sample.
In order to extend our robustness analysis, we implement a complete set of placebo
tests. We first estimate our baseline and DDD specifications by introducing artificially
timed treatments and artificially treated subjects. Subjects and treatments fake
assignments are drawn from two Bernoulli distributions with parameters p (prob-
ability of success) derived from the sample distributions of Treatedi,l,t and Posti,t
respectively. Within this setting, we should not observe any significant effect of PMGs
repeals on prices. Comfortingly, results reported in Table 10 confirm this prediction.
Next, we conduct another falsification test by estimating our models after substitut-
ing the dependent variable with a placebo outcome that should not be affected by
PMGs shutdown. In particular, we generate fake product prices drawn by random
distributions resembling sample ones (same mean and variance). Results shown in
Table 11 confirm the absence of any impact of PMGs repeals on fake outcome.
In order to analyze if our main results are robust to the exclusion of a particular
product we estimate the baseline model (1) after dropping one product at a time.
Results suggest that this is not the case and confirm all previous findings.23 In the
same spirit, we estimate equation (1) after balancing the panel dataset and all results
are confirmed.24 Finally, it is worth noting that results do not change if we compute
23Results, not reported, are available from the authors upon request.
24Precisely, we drop first 34 days in which we observe only some products; results are available upon
request.
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Table 10: DiD and DDD Estimates of the Impact of Fake Implementation Period on
Prices for Fake Treated/Control Samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Products Prices (log) DiD DiD DDD DDD
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t(Fake) 0.0018 0.0019
(0.00262) (0.00261)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t(Fake) 0.0033 0.0033
(0.00403) (0.00403)
Observations 9,028 9,028 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986
Controls NO YES NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.502 0.000 0.418 0.000
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls include
product popularity, number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard Errors in in
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: DiD and DDD Estimates of the Impact of PMGs on Fake Prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fake Products Prices (log) DiD DiD DDD DDD
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t -0.0011 -0.0011
(0.00154) (0.00154)
Ti,l,t ∗Pi,t ∗HRHVi,l,t -0.0013 -0.0013
(0.00203) (0.00204)
Observations 9,028 9,028 9,028 9,028
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Controls NO YES NO YES
Product Dummies YES YES YES YES
Time Dummies YES YES YES YES
F Test 0.466 0.722 0.516 0.746
Notes: All specifications include time and product fixed effects. Controls
include product popularity, number of reviews and rating. Robust Standard
Errors in in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
bootstrapped standard errors at product level.
6 Conclusions
In this work we empirically investigate the effects of Price Matching Guarantees
(PMGs) commercial policies on U.S. online consumer electronics prices by applying a
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Difference-in-Difference research design.
Estimates conducted over a sample of product prices, observed on the NewEgg
platform between May and October 2018, provide evidence in favor of an average price
reduction of about 3.9% after the interruption of the PMG policy. In order to have
a more detailed picture of the issue, we investigate if such effect is heterogeneous
across products. In particular, we focus on products features that might affect the
outcome of PMGs policies and that can be recovered exclusively on online markets.
Platform data allow us to obtain information from User Generated Contents (UGCs),
like product popularity and product quality, as well as online search visibility (Google
Search Rank); indeed, we believe that these product characteristics might provide
indirect information on consumers heterogeneity. Estimates conducted on specific
sub-samples show that when PMGs are interrupted, low quality (low search rank)
products experience a price increase of about 3.4%, while for high quality (high
visibility) products a price reduction of about 3.7% is observed.
These findings are in line with the lack of unambiguous predictions of the theo-
retical literature and are consistent with models predicting anti-competitive effects
of PMGs policies and with those interpreting such policies as a price discriminating
device. Theoretical models predicting anti-competitive effects of PMGs, suggest that
such policies might induce higher prices in oligopoly markets (as the online consumer
electronics) by sustaining collusion. In particular, online retailing platforms can
easily monitor competitors prices trough price-tracking systems and can react faster
to price signals, if compared to brick and mortar retailers. This possibility might
sustain collusion by decreasing information asymmetries among competitors and
reducing detection lags. On the other side, buyers’ sensitivity to product quality and
the willingness to engage in search activity can indirectly identify those customers
whose demand is more rigid, thus allowing price discrimination practices. Indeed,
e-commerce allows platforms to easily recover information on buyers, thanks also to
UGCs, thus favoring discrimination policies.
Models that predict anti-competitive effects of PMGs on prices are well suited
to explain the results for high quality and visible products. The demand of such
products is high and stable and consumers are likely to be available to pay a price
premium. Such features, together with easily detectable price signals,make collusion
more sustainable. Thus, PMGs policies might be an invitation to collude that can
be quickly and easily captured by competitors. However, it is worth noting that our
analysis does not allows us to support such theoretical interpretation of the results
since we do not analyse NewEggs competitors’ behavior.
Our empirical results are also consistent with theoretical models arguing that PMGs
act as price discrimination tools. Indeed, such theoretical explanation requires a
significant percentage of consumers invoking PMGs rights; unfortunately, we do not
have data on PMGs redemption frequency. However, Moorthy and Winter (2006) find
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redemption rates ranging between 5% and 25% on a sample of 46 retailers operating
in the United States and in Canada. It is reasonable to assume that online markets
redemption rates can be similar to physical ones, thus providing support to the price
discrimination interpretation of PMGs policies.
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Appendix
Table A1: Sub-Categories List.
Sub - Categories # products
CPU Processor 3
Computer Case 2
Mobile Phone 1
Scanner 2
Speaker 2
Motherboard 1
Monitor 3
Headset 1
USB Flash 1
CPU Cooler 1
Speaker for Domotic 1
Tablet 1
Desktop PC 1
Laptop PC 1
Power Supply 1
Printer 2
Memory Card 2
Hard Disk 1
Smart Thing Domotic 2
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Table A2: Products List.
Products Titles
AMD Ryzen 5 1500X Processor
Corsair Crystal Series 570X RGB - Tempered Glass; Premium ATX Mid-Tower Case
BlackBerry PRIV (32GB) Verizon Factory Unlocked Phone
Fujitsu fi-7160 Color Duplex Document Scanner
Fujitsu ScanSnap S1300i Instant PDF Multi Sheet-Fed Scanner
Philips BT50B/37 Wireless Portable Bluetooth Speaker
Asus ROG MAXIMUS VIII FORMULA DDR4 ATX Motherboards
ASUS VS247H-P 23.6 Full HD 1920x1080 2ms HDMI DVI VGA Monitor
Samsung Hmd Odyssey Windows Mixed Reality Headset
Samsung 128GB BAR (METAL) USB 3.0 Flash Drive
Corsair CW-9060025-WW Hydro Series Liquid CPU Cooler
Echo Dot (2nd Generation) - Smart speaker with Alexa - Black
ASUS VivoMini Mini PC
Dell XF9PJ Latitude 7490 Notebook
Intel Core i7-8700 Desktop Processor 6 Cores
AMD Ryzen 7 2700X Processor Wraith Prism LED Cooler
Corsair RMx Series RM850 x 80 PLUS Gold Fully Modular ATX Power Supply
ASUS 24-inch Full HD FreeSync Gaming Monitor
Brother Monochrome Laser Printer; Compact All-in One Printer
Team 64GB microSDXC UHS-I/U1 Class 10 Memory Card with Adapter
LG Electronics 21.5 Screen LED-Lit Monitor
HP LaserJet Pro M227fdw All-in-One Wireless Laser Printer
Logitech Z313 Speaker System + Logitech Bluetooth Audio Adapter Bundle
PNY CS900 960GB 2.5 Sata III Internal Solid State Drive (SSD)
Samsung SmartThings ADT Wireless Home Security Starter Kit
Samsung SmartThings Smart Home Hub
Rosewill 2U Server Chassis Server Case (RSV-2600)
Corsair Apple Certified 16GB (2 x 8GB) DDR3 1333 MHz (PC3 10600) Laptop Memory
Acer Iconia One 10 NT.LDPAA.003 10.1-Inch Tablet
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